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11 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, security of gas supply has been high on the political agenda in Europe. Gas
import dependence of the European OECD bloc will increase from 45% in 2006 to 69% in
2030, according to the IEA (2008) Reference Scenario. Russia plays a crucial role, given that
it already supplies more than half of Europe’s gas imports and that it has the largest proven
natural gas reserves in the world (BP, 2006-2008).1 This has been a source of increasing polit-
ical concern, especially since 2006, when Russian gas export monopolist Gazprom launched
an effort to increase the gas prices paid by Russia’s neighboring states, as shown in Table 1.
The price conﬂict in Ukraine sparked strong political reactions in Europe, because it led to








Ukraine 50 230 130
Belarus 46 200 100
Georgia 100 235 235
Moldova 80 (unknown) 170
Note: tcm = thousand cubic meters. Source: Press sources (2006)
interruptions of gas supplies to Europe in the beginning of 2006 and 2009. Energy supply
security and in particular the potential unreliability of Russian gas imports became an impor-
tant topic at EU summits and G8 meetings, and in bilateral discussions with Russia. After the
second conﬂict in January 2009, Czech Prime Minister Topolanek – then President of the EU
– even stated explicitly that “the EU must weaken its dependence on Russian gas imports”
(IHT, Jan 28, 2009).2
1In this paper, the terms Europe and European refer to the EU-27 plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland,
unless indicated otherwise.
2It should be noted that the relation between Russia and Europe is very different from the relation between
Russia and its neigboring states, which, before the price increase, were receiving gas from Russia at prices
below netback parity. In addition, it is suspected that Russia’s price increases in neighboring states are a prelude
to deregulation of Russia’s domestic gas market, which currently also has below-market prices. On the other
hand, Russian gas prices for Europe in 2006 were already in line with the prices in the middle column of Table
2This paper provides an economic perspective on Russia’s strategic position in the Euro-
pean gas market by answering the following two research questions:
1. What is the potential impact of Russian unreliability on the European gas market, and
how does this affect European gas import decisions?
2. To what extent should Europe invest in gas storage capacity to mitigate the effects of
potential Russian unreliability?
We study long-term gas contracting in a non-cooperative setting, using a partial equilib-
rium model of the European gas market, with differentiated competition between one poten-
tially unreliable ‘dominant ﬁrm’ (Russia) and a reliable ‘competitive fringe’ of other non-
European import suppliers. Russia’s potential unreliability is modeled by assuming that there
is a probability  that Russia does not comply with the long-term contracts it has signed: with
probability , Russia ‘defaults’ and withholds supply to increase its price to monopolistic
levels for a duration of 4 months. The numerical analysis in this paper shows that it is not
optimal for Russia to cut gas supplies to Europe completely during a crisis: rather, one can
expect Russia to reduce its gas supplies by roughly 40% during the 4 months, thereby tem-
porarily increasing gas prices by roughly 40%. More importantly, the analysis shows that not
only Europe but also Russia suffers when Russia’s probability of default  increases. Indeed,
as Russia becomes – or is perceived as – more unreliable, Europe procures a larger volume
of long-term gas import contracts from the competitive fringe. This way, Europe makes itself
less dependent on Russia and therefore less vulnerable in the event of Russian withholding.
With increasing Russian unreliability, the volume of long-term gas import contracts with Rus-
sia decreases while Russia has to grant an ever higher discount in its contracts. The resulting
negative impact on Russia’s proﬁts is not sufﬁciently counterbalanced by the gains it makes
in case it does not comply with its contracts. As a result, Russia’s expected proﬁts are found
1, which made Europe a proﬁtable and important customer for Russia. Given that, in addition, Gazprom was
trying to enter the downstream European gas market, Russia was unlikely to act in the same way towards Europe
as it did towards Ukraine. Nevertheless, as a result of the Ukrainian gas crises, European politicians and gas
consumers clearly started questioning the reliability of Russia as a gas supplier.
3to decrease as Russia’s unreliability increases. As mentioned before, investments in strategic
gas storage capacity can reduce Europe’s vulnerability. However, the numerical simulations
show that strategic storage capacity is only attractive for Europe if Russian unreliability is
high ( of more than 30%) and storage capacity costs are reduced by a factor 3 to 4 compared
to typical current cost levels.
Earlier papers have studied Russian gas imports into Europe from different perspectives.
Hirschhausen et al. (2005) focus on the strategic interaction between Russia and transit coun-
tries such as Ukraine and Belarus. Grais and Zheng (1996) analyze the quantity, price and
transit fee of gas contracts between Russia and Europe, in a hierarchical three-stage Stack-
elberg game in which Russia is the leader, followed by the transit country, which in turn is
followed by the response of European demand (factoring in a potential alternative gas sup-
plier). They study the impact of exogenous shocks, e.g. an exogenous change in the prefer-
ence for Russian gas over other gas, and they mention reliability as a potential cause of such
a shock. Our model has a non-cooperative multi-stage structure similar to Grais and Zheng
(1996), but goes a step further by explicitly examining how reliability affects the demand for
Russian gas compared to gas from other suppliers: a demand shift resulting from a change
in (un-)reliability is an endogenous effect in our model. In addition, our paper investigates
investment in strategic gas storage capacity. On the ﬂip side, to keep the paper focused, we do
not model the strategic behavior of transit countries.
The effect of a Russian supply interruption has recently been examined by Hartley and
Medlock (2009): as part of their analysis of potential futures for Russian gas exports, they
use a comprehensive numerical dynamic spatial equilibrium model to study the global sup-
ply chain repercussions of a scenario in which Russia withholds roughly one third of its gas
supplies to Europe during a 4-month period. Hartley and Medlock (2009) model the interrup-
tion as a deterministic shock with exogenous size. In contrast, in our model, the size of the
shock is endogenous, and more importantly, there is uncertainty as to whether the shock will
occur. Our model provides an analytical study of how the anticipation of a possible shock
4– in other words, the perception of unreliability – alters strategic decisions. Our methodol-
ogy for modeling unreliability is taken from the pioneering paper by Nordhaus (1974), who
analyzes oil supply interruptions using a model with two regimes: a normal regime and a
supply interruption regime, each with its probability. Like Nordhaus (1974), we investigate
the option of investing in storage capacity.3 However, in addition, our model analyzes the
contrast between an unreliable supplier and a reliable competitive fringe. In this setting, gas
import contracts with the reliable competitive fringe and investments in storage capacity are
(imperfect) substitutes.
Since our paper studies long-term gas import contracts, there are similarities with the
literature that deals with these contracts (such as Boucher et al., 1987, and Neuhoff and
Hirschhausen, 2005) and with the ‘hold-up’ literature, such as Hubert and Ikonnikova (2004).
However, an important difference between the approach in this paper and the approach of Hu-
bert and Ikonnikova (2004) or Ikonnikova and Zwart (2009) is that the latter two papers use
cooperative game theory and explicitly model the negotiation/bargaining between the various
parties. Our paper, in contrast, describes the gas market in a non-cooperative setting with
quantity competition, following the seminal work of Mathiesen et al. (1987), several well-
known analyses such as Golombek et al. (1995, 1998), Boots et al. (2004) and more recent
work such as Holz et al. (2008) and Lise et al. (2008).4 Most of this literature considers Euro-
pean consumers as price-takers with linear demand, which is also the approach taken in this
paper.5
On a broader microeconomic level, the analysis of this paper ﬁts into the literature on dif-
ferentiated competition. Indeed, as will be shown in Section 3, the contrast of a potentially
3Nordhaus (1974) also investigates import taxes, but it turns out that storage is the most speciﬁc response to
supply security concerns. In this paper, storage shall therefore be used as the exempliﬁcation of a broader range
of policy measures (e.g. import taxes, rationing, subsidies for renewable energy, etc.).
4Note in particular that an analysis of long-term contracts is not considered inconsistent with non-cooperative
modeling. On the contrary, Boots et al. (2004) also use (non-cooperative) Cournot-Nash modeling, which they
justify by writing “competition can be expected to take place through quantities, since long-term take-or-pay
contracts still prevail in the natural gas market” (Boots et al., 2004, p.74).
5However, unlike this paper, the models of Boots et al. (2004) and Golombek et al. (1995, 1998) analyze a
segmentation of the European market, based on country and/or type of consumer and/or season. Our paper has
only one aggregate demand curve. Note that Holz et al. (2008), as an exception, use non-linear demand curves.
5unreliable gas import supplier (in this case: Russia) and a set of reliable import suppliers (in
this case: the competitive fringe of other non-European import suppliers), results in a market
structure similar to differentiated competition. Singh and Vives (1984) for example, com-
pare Cournot and Bertrand competition in differentiated duopoly, while Gaudet and Moreaux
(1990) do the same for the particular case of nonrenewable natural resources. The main con-
tribution of our paper is that it introduces the notion of unreliability directly into the market
structure of the European gas market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the set-up and main assumptions
of the model. Section 3 develops the analytical solution for the computation of the equilibria.
Section 4 presents the numerical results. Finally, Section 5 returns to the initial research
questions.
2 MODEL OF THE EUROPEAN IMPORTED GAS MAR-
KET
2.1 European demand, domestic supply, and objective function
Europe is modeled as a large number of uncoordinated gas consumers and domestic gas pro-
ducers, with an overarching government that can decide to invest public funds in gas storage
capacity. We assume Europe is a price-taker with a linear long-run inverse demand curve for
gas:
p(q) =  + q (1)
European domestic producers supply an exogenous and ﬁxed quantity qD, and the remaining
excess demand q   qD needs to be satisﬁed by non-European imports. Short-run demand is
also linear, but with a steeper slope SR:
pSR(q) = p
 + SR  (q   q
) (2)
with (p;q) representing the long-run equilibrium.
6We assume that decisions on long-term gas import contracts and publicly ﬁnanced strate-
gic storage capacity investments are based on a combination of the interests of importers,
end-consumers, domestic producers and taxpayers. We therefore assume that Europe maxi-
mizes the expected total ‘European surplus’ E[S]:
maxE[S] with S = CS + D   G (3)
where CS is the consumer surplus,6 D represents the proﬁts of domestic producers, and G is
the public expenditure on gas storage capacity investments.  G represents the interests of the
recipients of marginal expenditures out of general government revenue. Note that equation
(3) assumes risk-neutrality. Annex D deals with the case of European risk aversion.
2.2 Non-European gas import suppliers
Excess demand needs to be satisﬁed by signing long-term import contracts with non-European
import suppliers. We assume that the non-European import suppliers have a dominant ﬁrm –
competitive fringe structure.7 Russia is the ‘dominant ﬁrm’ and the other non-European gas
import suppliers are grouped together as the ‘competitive fringe’.
Russia is modeled as a monolithic entity, i.e. no difference is made between the Russian
state and the gas exporter Gazprom. Russia is assumed to be a risk-neutral proﬁt maximizer.
Russia is modeled to be unreliable: once the long-term contracts have been signed, there is a
probability  that Russia temporarily does not comply with its previous supply commitments,
i.e. Russia ‘defaults’. Conversely, there is a probability (1   ) that Russia complies with its
long-term contracts during the entire period. All participants know the parameter  upfront.8
Russia’s long-run marginal costs of production are assumed constant at cR.
6For the sake of simplicity, our model does not go to the level of individual end-consumers such as house-
holds, industrial users and power generators. Therefore, the term CS, as we will compute it based on demand
curve (1), is in fact the importer surplus. In practice, this surplus is somehow divided into importers’ proﬁts on
the one hand and end-consumer surplus on the other hand. We will not make that distinction, since it depends on
market power and regulation in individual countries. We will simply refer to CS as ‘consumer surplus’.
7This fairly standard model of industrial organization is described in multiple textbooks, e.g. Carlton and
Perloff (2000, Chapter 4).
8Hence,  is exogenous, and there is perfect and complete information about it. The rationale for exogeneity
of  is that Russia’s decision-makers are also aware of the potential unreliability of the Russian state, and that
they do not have full control over Russia’s image of unreliability, nor over Russia’s actual behavior over the
7The competitive fringe is a diversiﬁed set of current or potential future non-European gas
import suppliers, including both pipeline and LNG supplies. Therefore, we assume that – as
a group – the competitive fringe is reliable: even if Russia defaults, the competitive fringe
delivers the originally promised contract quantity q0 at the originally promised contract price
p0. This requires two assumptions. First, we assume that the long-term gas import contracts
between Europe and the competitive fringe are not indexed on any gas spot market price,
which would rise sharply in the event of Russian default. In practice, this condition is fulﬁlled
since most current long-term gas import contracts contain little or no indexation on gas spot
market prices. Second, we assume that the competitive fringe players do not deviate from
their contracts. This is a major assumption, which can be justiﬁed by the difference in scale
between Russia and each of the other non-European import suppliers. Each of the other non-
European import suppliers has much less incentive to be unreliable because the market impact
of each of them is much smaller. In addition, a supplier who is perceived as unreliable could
face the threat of being replaced by another supplier in the long term. Russia, on the other
hand, is hard to replace completely in the long term, even if it behaves unreliably. As we
will see below in Section 2.3, the reliability of the competitive fringe does not mean that –
in the event of Russian default – there would be price discrimination between end-consumers
of Russian gas and end-consumers of gas from the competitive fringe. There will be only
one single end-consumer price.9 However, the rents that result from the compliance of the
competitive fringe in the event of Russian default accrue to European importers. Therefore,
the most important implication of our assumption is that these rents are part of the European
surplus function S in equation (3), and are not part of the proﬁts of the competitive fringe. As
for costs, we assume that the long-run marginal cost curve of the competitive fringe is linearly
entire period for which gas contracts are signed. For instance, although Russia never cut gas supplies to Europe
during the Ukrainian gas conﬂicts, the conﬂict nevertheless led to an increased perception of unreliability in
Europe. As we will see later, our model shows that if Russia had full control over its unreliability, it would be
optimal for Russia to be perfectly reliable ( = 0). Since we want to study the effects of increased unreliability
(whether it is pursued deliberately or not), we make  exogenous. In Section 5, we mention a different approach
which could lead to an endogenous .
9One could imagine offering interruptible contracts to industrial consumers at a discount. We will not con-
sider that option in this paper.
8increasing: c0 + d0q0 (with q0 the volume of long-term gas import contracts supplied by the
competitive fringe, and c0, d0 positive constants).
The above-mentioned long-run marginal cost functions (i.e. cR for Russia, and c0 + d0q0
forthecompetitivefringe)includenotonlyproductioncosts, butalsotransportationcosts. The
calibration for the numerical simulations of Section 4 will take this into account.10 Finally,
since this paper analyzes the gas market on an aggregated European level and does not model
gas delivery to end-consumers, distribution costs are irrelevant.
2.3 Structure of the game
The interaction between Europe, Russia and the competitive fringe, is modeled as a game in
three stages. Figure 1 explains the different stages of the game. In a nutshell: in Stage 1
Europe decides how much it invests in strategic gas storage capacity; Stage 2 is the stage in
which Europe signs long-term gas import contracts with Russia and the competitive fringe;
Stage 3 consists in the execution of the long-term gas import contracts, in which Russia may
or may not comply with the long-term contracts it has signed. We represent the imported gas
quantities by qR;1 (Russia complies with long-term contracts), qR;2 (Russia defaults) and q0
(competitive fringe). The corresponding prices are denoted pR;1, pR;2 and p0.
Before describing each of the stages in detail, it is important to note how the stochastic
outcome of Stage 3 inﬂuences the strategic interaction in Stage 2. Figure 2 illustrates how
Europe and Russia factor the expected value of Stage 3 pay-offs into their decisions in Stage
2. In Stage 3, European surplus is either S = S1 or S = S2 depending on whether Russia
complies with its long-term contracts or not. In Stage 2, Europe therefore tries to maximize
the expected surplus E[S]. This maximization problem can be translated into demand func-
tions for Russian and other long-term gas import contracts by ﬁnding – for given long-term
10Note that, while certain parts of the transportation cost can be estimated reasonably well (e.g. LNG ship-
ping from overseas suppliers to Europe), transportation sometimes relies on transit countries (e.g. Ukraine),
which leads to additional complexity. For example, Hirschhausen et al. (2005) explicitly study the strategic
considerations involved in gas transport from Russia to Europe via transit countries Ukraine and Belarus. While
these considerations are important, our paper focuses on the strategic interaction between Europe and its import
suppliers. We use OME (2002) estimates of the transit fees.
9Figure 1: Timeline and decisions in the model proposed in this paper
Case 1 – Russia 
complies with long-
term contracts:











Europe decides construction of strategic gas storage capacity qS
Probability
(1 – δ )
Probability
δ
‘Nature’ decides whether Russia defaults or not (i.e., this is a 
probabilistic event)
Case 2 – Russia 
‘defaults’:




‘Dominant firm – competitive fringe’ game, with Europe as price-taker:
– Russia (dominant firm) decides to promise gas contract quantity qR,1
– Competitive fringe decides to promise gas contract quantity q0
– Europe’s inverse demand curves determine gas contract prices pR,1




Timeline Decisions (decision-makers in italics)
Stage 2:
Signing long-
term gas import 
contracts
Outcome
gas contract prices – the optimal long-term gas contract quantities that maximize Europe’s
expected surplus E[S] in Stage 3. In the ‘dominant ﬁrm – competitive fringe’ game in Stage
2, dominant ﬁrm Russia sets the optimal gas contract quantity to maximize its expected proﬁts
E[R] in Stage 3, taking into account the supply curve of the competitive fringe and Europe’s
above-mentioned demand functions for Russian and other long-term gas import contracts. Eu-
ropean demand for long-term gas import contracts will turn out to be differentiated between
gas import contracts from Russia and gas import contracts from the competitive fringe, be-
cause their effect in Stage 3 is different. The rest of this section describes the three stages in
more detail.
In Stage 1, Europe decides to foresee a quantity qS (in bcm, i.e. billion cubic meters) of
strategic gas storage capacity, to be used as a buffer in case of withholding of gas supply by
Russia. Given the long lead times involved in the development of storage sites, this decision
cannot be postponed until it is known whether Russia will comply with its contracts or not
10Figure 2: Impact of the stochastic outcome of Stage 3 on the strategic interaction in
Stage 2
Note: the actions of the competitive fringe are not included in this diagram because their profits are not 
different between Case 1 and Case 2, and because they behave non-strategically in Stage 2
• Case 1 – Russia complies with long-term contracts:
– Europe obtains surplus S=S1
– Russia obtains profits ΠR = ΠR,1
• Case 2 – Russia ‘defaults’:
– Europe obtains surplus S=S2
– Russia obtains profits ΠR = ΠR,2
• Europe:
– Europe expects to obtain surplus E[S] = (1-δ) S1 + δ S2 in Stage 3
– Therefore, Europe’s demand functions for gas import contracts in 
Stage 2 can be determined by finding the contract quantities qR,1 and 
q0 that maximize expected surplus E[S] for given prices pR,1 and p0
– Because gas import contracts from Russia and from the competitive
fringe have a different effect in Stage 3, Europe has a different 
willingness-to-pay for gas import contracts from Russia and from the 
competitive fringe
• Russia:
– Russia expects to obtain profits E [ΠR ] = (1-δ) ΠR,1 + δ ΠR,2 in 
Stage 3
– In the ‘dominant firm – competitive fringe’ game in Stage 2, Russia
chooses its contract quantity qR,1 to maximize expected profits, given
(i) the supply curve of the competitive fringe, and (ii) the European
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(i.e. it cannot wait until Stage 3). Furthermore, in our model, the storage capacity investment
decisiontakesplacebeforedecisionsaremaderegardingtheamountsoflong-termgasimports
that are contracted from Russia and the competitive fringe (i.e. before Stage 2). The reason is
that investment in storage capacity is a decision that Europe can make unilaterally. By making
the storage capacity investment decision in a separate stage upfront (Stage 1), Europe gives its
storage capacity investment decision an advantageous Stackelberg leadership position in the
strategic game with its gas import suppliers. In making the decision about storage capacity
investment, Europe takes into account the strategic behavior of Stage 2, and it has perfect and
complete information to do so.
In Stage 2 Europe signs long-term gas import contracts with Russia and with the compet-
itive fringe. Our approach is non-cooperative, with Europe as a price-taker in a ‘dominant
ﬁrm – competitive fringe’ model of the long-term gas import contract market. Russia, as the
11dominant ﬁrm, puts a quantity qR;1 (in bcm per year) on the European market, for which it
receives a price pR;1 (in EUR per tcm, i.e. EUR per thousand cubic meters).11 In making its
decision, Russia already takes into account the subsequent decision of the competitive fringe,
who put a quantity q0 (in bcm per year) on the market, for which they receive a price p0 (in
EUR per tcm). The prices pR;1 and p0 are the response of the European inverse demand func-
tions to the quantities qR;1 and q0. The quantity-price pairs (qR;1;pR;1) and (q0;p0) represent
the long-term gas import contracts signed between Europe and Russia, and between Europe
and the competitive fringe, respectively. Because of Russian unreliability, the prices pR;1 and
p0 do not need to be the same. Although there are separate inverse demand functions for
Russian and other gas – resulting from the behavior of importers – the end-consumers face a
single price for gas and cannot choose their own mix of reliable and non-reliable gas. There
is a single end-consumer price in each of the two states of the world in Stage 3.
Stage 3, the ﬁnal stage of the game, is the execution of the long-term gas import contracts
signed in Stage 2. Stage 3 is the stage that results in actual pay-offs for the participants to the
game. We study one representative year: although the import contracts and storage capacity
investment decisions are long-term decisions that will hold for multiple years, all volumes and
monetary pay-offs in Stage 3 are shown as annual amounts. In a representative year, there is
a probability 1  that Russia honors its commitments, and effectively delivers qR;1 at a price
pR;1. This is ‘Case 1’ (Russia complies with long-term contracts). Figure 3 illustrates Case
1 graphically. qD is the gas supply from European domestic producers, which is assumed to
be exogenous and ﬁxed (inelastic). The shaded area, S1, is the European surplus according
to equation (3), but without taking any storage capacity investments into account.12 End-
consumers pay a single price corresponding to p 2 [pR;1;p0], such that demand at price p is
exactly equal to q0 + qR;1. In a representative year, there is also a probability  of default, in
11Note that bcm per year is consistently used for quantities, while EUR / tcm is consistently used for price.
The alternative use of bcm and tcm makes the resulting quantity and price numbers conveniently end up in the
0-200 range.
12For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the domestic suppliers have zero cost, hence the shaded area for
q 2 [0;qD] in Figure 3 extends all the way down to the horizontal axis. A non-zero cost would merely constitute
a uniform shift of the European surplus function, which would not affect results.
12Figure 3: Demand and supply in Case 1 –
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which case Russia withholds supply to maximize short-run proﬁts. This is ‘Case 2’ (Russia
defaults), which is depicted in Figure 4. Assuming that neither qD nor q0 can increase in
the short run, Russia can set qR;2 < qR;1, for which it can command a price pR;2  pR;1.
Note that this price is derived from the short-run demand curve (2). Europe responds by
cutting consumption and using the maximum amount of stored gas, which is constrained
by the storage capacity qS chosen in Stage 1. The storage capacity investment only covers
the cost of the storage facility and the capital cost of the unused gas, but not the purchase
price of the stored gas itself. The gas withdrawn from the storage will therefore need to
be replaced for future crises, and we assume that this can be done at some point at a price
equal to p0. Effectively, the price of using gas from the storage is therefore p0 (in addition
to storage capacity costs, which are sunk). The competitive fringe always delivers q0 at price
p0, whatever happens in Stage 3. As before, this does not mean that identical end-consumers
would pay different prices in the event of Russian default. Since the marginal unit of gas
import supply in the short run in case of Russian default has a cost pR;2 (because only Russia
could increase supply), the ‘marginal’ price for end-consumers should correspond to pR;2.
While this does create a rent (pR;2   p0)q0, the rent is part of the European surplus.13 In total,
13Both in Case 1 and in Case 2, there may be a rent (or loss) for importers, because the price paid by end-
13the European surplus in case of Russian default is lower than S1 from Figure 3. Figure 4
shows S, the loss in European surplus due to Russian default. This loss is discussed in more
detail in equation (8) in the next section.
Thethreestagesofthegamerepresentthreedistinctdecisions. Weassumethatthis3-stage
game is played once. In practice, the game is obviously repeated after a number of years, but
because the lead times for gas projects are very long, we do not consider the repeated game.
Finally, if Russia ‘defaults’ (probability ), the assumption is that this happens only during a
fraction  of the year. For the remaining fraction (1   ) of the year, Russia respects qR;1 and
pR;1. This is comparable with the approach taken by Hartley and Medlock (2009): in their
scenario of a Russian supply interruption, they consider a supply reduction which lasts for
4 months in the year 2010. In our model, this corresponds to setting  = 4=12.14 If Russia
defaults, Figure 4 represents the supply situation during a fraction  of the year, while Figure 3
representsthesupplysituationduringtheremainingfraction(1 )oftheyear.15 Thevolumes
qD, q0, qS, qR;2 shown in Figure 4 should be interpreted as annualized volumes.16 This means,
consumers (p in Case 1, and pR;2 in Case 2) does not correspond to the average price paid by the importers
(a weighted average of p0 and pR;1 in Case 1, and a weighted average of p0 and pR;2 in Case 2). This positive
or negative rent is treated as an integral part of European surplus. In the simplest situation, the rent takes the
form of windfall proﬁts (or losses) for gas importers. However, more realistically, we can expect that European
governments would intervene and take measures that would redistribute the rents (or losses) to end-consumers,
e.g. through non-linear tariffs. One example of non-linear tariffs during a Russian default (Case 2), would be a
measure that allows all households a rationed share of q0+qS at a price corresponding to p0, while the remaining
gas imports are priced according to pR;2. This measure would distribute the rent (pR;2 p0)q0 to end-consumers
whilst ensuring that demand is reduced to the available gas quantity qD +q0 +qS +qR;2 because the ‘marginal’
price perceived by households is still pR;2.
14One could argue that this is a relatively high number given e.g. the fact that the Ukrainian gas crises lasted
only a few days/weeks compared to a history of decades of uninterrupted gas supply. However, as stated before,
the model in this paper analyzes a situation that is very different from the Ukrainian gas crisis, and we want to
be sufﬁciently conservative. The impact of a lower value of  would be that less weight would be given to S
in the computation of Europe’s expected surplus (equation 9). As a result, higher values of  would be needed to
reach the effects observed in the simulations in Section 4.
15Obviously, if Russia complies with its contracts, then Figure 3 represents the supply situation during the
entire year.
16The notion ‘annualized’ in this paper means that the quantity is extrapolated to an entire year. For example,
suppose Europe has a contract with Russia for qR;1 = 120 bcm per year, i.e. 10 bcm per month. During a
4-month crisis ( = 4=12), Russia reduces supply from 10 bcm per month to 6 bcm per month. In that case, we
will have qR;2 = 126 = 72 bcm per year. Note however, that the crisis lasts for only 4 months, so the volume
supplied by Russia during the crisis is only 4  6 = 24 bcm. However, to make the magnitude of qR;1 and qR;2
comparable, we choose to represent annualized amounts in the ﬁgures and formulas: everything is expressed per
year.
14in particular, that in order to have access to an annualized storage withdrawal volume of qS
during a Russian default (which lasts for a fraction  of the year), a storage capacity of only
qS is needed. Furthermore, the total European surplus S2 during a representative year in the
event of Russian default is given by:
S2 = (1   )S1 + (S1   S) = S1   S (4)
In summary, our model describes Russia’s unreliability as a potential ‘default’ event, with
a probability  of default.17 The model takes into account two ways for Europe to escape from
the unreliability of Russian gas supplies: on the one hand, diversiﬁcation by signing long-term
contracts with the competitive fringe, and on the other hand, investments in strategic storage
capacity.18 The next section solves the model analytically.
3 ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
We now analyze the game described in Section 2 using backward induction. Figure 5 gives an
overview of the successive steps in the solution procedure. This section discusses each of the
steps in detail.
3.1 Stage 3: Execution of contracts
Stage 3 determines the pay-offs for Europe, Russia and the competitive fringe. There are two
possible cases: either Russia complies with the long-term contracts it has signed (Case 1) or
Russia ‘defaults’ (Case 2). We will compute the pay-offs of Europe and Russia in each of
these two cases.
17The model thus accounts for uncertainty in Russia’s behavior (i.e. deliberate supply withholding and price
increases), as opposed to technical uncertainty. Technical uncertainty is the risk of a sudden supply interruption
because of technical failure of e.g. gas pipeline systems. Technical uncertainty is not considered in this paper.
18Similarly, the section on supply security in the energy policy communication of the European Commission
(2007) emphasizes strategic storage and diversiﬁcation.
15Figure 5: Solution of the model using backward induction
• Compute pay-offs in Case 1:
– European surplus S1(qR,1, q0, pR,1, p0)
– Russian profits ΠR,1(qR,1, pR,1)
• Compute pay-offs in Case 2:
– European surplus S2(qR,1, q0, pR,1, p0, qS, qR,2, pR,2)
– Russian profits ΠR,2(qR,1, pR,1, qR,2, pR,2)
with qR,2=qR,2(qR,1, q0, qS) and pR,2= pR,2(qR,1, q0, qS)
• Determine European demand functions for long-term gas import 
contracts by finding the contract quantities qR,1(pR,1, p0, qS) and 
q0(pR,1, p0, qS) that maximize expected surplus E[S] for given prices 
pR,1, p0and given storage capacity qS ; Use the result to compute the 
inverse demand functions for gas import contracts: pR,1(qR,1, q0, qS)
and p0(qR,1, q0, qS)
• Determine the non-strategic contract quantity setting behavior of the 
competitive fringe, given a contract quantity decision by Russia: 
q0(qR,1, qS)
• Determine the strategic contract quantity setting behavior of ‘dominant 














• Determine Europe’s strategic storage capacity investment decision by 
finding the optimal qS that maximizes E[S], given the anticipated







Case 1: Russia complies with long-term contracts. In this case, the European surplus in
a representative year corresponds to the shaded area S1 in Figure 3:
S1 =   (qD + q0 + qR;1) +
1
2
  (qD + q0 + qR;1)
2   p0q0   pR;1qR;1   cSqS (5)
This result is obtained by applying equation (3), or directly graphically from Figure 3. The
ﬁrst two terms are simply the integration of the inverse demand curve (1) on the interval
[0;qD +q0 +qR;1]. The next two terms represent the expenditure on imported gas, taking into
account that both Russia and the competitive fringe comply with their contracts. The last term
is the yearly storage capacity cost G = cSqS. In this expression, cS is the yearly constant
marginal cost of gas storage capacity, expressed in EUR per tcm per year. One could interpret
G as the yearly rent to be paid for the storage site. Note that G has to be paid whether or not
the gas is actually withdrawn.
16Russia’s proﬁts in a representative year in Case 1 are:
R;1 = (pR;1   cR)qR;1 (6)
Case 2: Russia defaults. In this case, Russia does not supply qR;1 at pR;1, but delivers
a lower quantity qR;2 at a higher price pR;2, for a fraction  of the representative year. Since
Russia’s unilateral action comes as a surprise, the relation between qR;2 and pR;2 is determined
by Europe’s short-run demand curve (2), taking into account the mitigating effect of storage.










   SR(qR;1   qS) + cR] (7)
Remember that SR < 0 and so the second term in the expression for pR;2 is a positive mark-
up. Higher qR;1 or lower qS lead to higher vulnerability of Europe and therefore increase the
potential monopoly price pR;2. In other words, the impact of Russian unreliability is larger
when Russia has a larger market share to begin with (larger qR;1), or when Europe has less
strategic gas storage capacity (lower qS). The price pR;2 also increases with p, because p is
the starting point of the European price before Russian withholding.
The loss in European surplus during the Russian default can be derived from Figure 4:
S = (p0   pR;1)qS + (pR;2   pR;1)qR;2 +
+ [(p




)](qR;1   qS   qR;2) (8)
S applies only during the crisis, which lasts for a fraction  of the year. Note that the value
of S is an annualized amount, like qR;2. The ﬁrst term in equation (8) is the consumer
surplus lost because gas from the storage is more expensive than the original contract with
Russia. The second term is the consumer surplus lost because of the Russian price increase
from pR;1 to pR;2. The last line in equation (8) is the loss of consumer surplus due to the
unserved demand qR;1  qS  qR;2. In Figure 4, this corresponds to the part of the striped area
17above the interval q 2 [qD + q0 + qS + qR;2;qD + q0 + qR;1]. The total European surplus S2
in a representative year in which Russia defaults can be obtained by substituting equation (8)
into equation (4).
Russia’s annualized proﬁts during the 4-month crisis are (pR;2   cR)qR;2. Russia’s proﬁts
R;2 during an entire representative year in which Russia defaults are simply a weighted
average of this amount and R;1, with weights  and 1   , respectively.
Since p = + (qD +q0 +qR;1), equations (5) through (8) can be easily expressed as a
function of qS, qR;1, q0, pR;1 and p0, i.e. the parameters of Stages 1 and 2. The results of these
equations are taken into account by Europe and Russia when they make strategic decisions in
Stage 2.
3.2 Stage 2: Signing long-term gas import contracts
In Stage 2, Europe signs long-term gas import contracts with Russia and with the competitive
fringe, i.e. the quantities qR;1 and q0 and the prices pR;1 and p0 are determined. In our non-
cooperative setting, Russia and the competitive fringe set quantities to maximize proﬁts while
taking into account Europe’s inverse demand functions. In our solution procedure, we will
ﬁrst determine the European inverse demand functions for long-term gas import contracts,
then determine the non-strategic decisions of the competitive fringe, and ﬁnally analyze the
actions of ‘dominant ﬁrm’ Russia.
Europeaninversedemandfunctionsforlong-termgasimportcontracts. Forgivenlong-
term gas import contract prices pR;1 and p0, European demand for long-term gas import is
derived by ﬁnding the optimal quantities qR;1 and q0 that maximize the expected value of
European surplus E[S]:
E[S] = (1   )S1 + S2 = S1   S (9)
withS1 andS ascomputedabove. TheresultingquantitiesqR;1(pR;1;p0;qS)andq0(pR;1;p0;qS)
will also be a function of stage-1 decision variable qS. By inverting the resulting expressions,
18we obtain the inverse demand functions. For the special case in which  = 1, qS = qD = 0
























with k = SR=  1 and  = 1   (3 + k 1)=4 > 0. These are the inverse demand
functions for differentiated competition: because of Russian unreliability in Stage 3, the long-
term gas import contract sector in Stage 2 is transformed into a two-good sector. The two
differentiated goods are long-term gas import contracts with Russia on the one hand, and
long-term gas import contracts with the competitive fringe on the other hand. The prices
of these two goods can be different. The price obtained by Russia depends not only on the
quantity set by Russia, but also on the quantity set by the competitive fringe (and vice versa).
Note that the differentiation applies only at the contracting stage (Stage 2). Once the gas ﬂows
(Stage 3), the gas molecules are identical and there is by assumption no more differentiation at
the ﬁnal consumer’s end. Since  < 0, the partial derivatives @p0=@q0, @p0=@qR;1, @pR;1=@q0
and @pR;1=@qR;1 in equation (10) are all negative, as is expected for substitute goods.
A quick check is that for  = 0 and hence  = 1, there is no more differentiation between
the two suppliers, and equations (10) reduce to equation (1). When  > 0, we observe that
@pR;1=@qR;1 < @p0=@q0 (both are negative), meaning that Russia faces a more elastic demand
curve than the competitive fringe, due to its unreliability. Likewise, @pR;1=@q0 < @p0=@qR;1:
Russia’s price drops more steeply in response to a quantity increase by the competitive fringe
than vice versa. The effect of the asymmetry in Europe’s preferences is that Russia’s contract
price pR;1 will be lower than p0. In other words: when  > 0, Russia needs to offer Europe
a discount p = p0   pR;1 > 0 due to its unreliability. Annex B shows that in general, for












with eSR the short-run price elasticity of European demand for gas. Russia’s discount in-
creases with the probability  and duration  of possible interruptions, and with Europe’s
19dependence on Russian long-term gas import contracts as a share of the total gas supply
(qR;1=q). Russia’s discount decreases as Europe’s short-run price elasticity of demand jeSRj
increases (in absolute terms).
Non-strategic quantity decision by the competitive fringe. By deﬁnition, the competitive
fringe behaves non-strategically and supplies long-term gas import contracts to Europe up to
thepointwherethecontractpriceequalsthemarginalcostofadditionallong-termgasimports.








d0   ( + 3
4)
qR;1 (12)
which provides us with the reaction of the competitive fringe as a function of the decision qR;1
by ‘dominant ﬁrm’ Russia.
Quantity decision by ‘dominant ﬁrm’ Russia. The ‘dominant ﬁrm’ Russia faces a residual
(inverse) demand function pR;1 = pR;1(qR;1), which is found by substituting equation (12)
in the expression for pR;1 in equation (10). Using the residual demand function, Russia’s
expected proﬁts E[R] = (1   )R;1 + R;2 can be expressed as a function of qR;1 (and
qS). Russia chooses a long-term contract quantity qR;1 to maximize E[R] as a monopolist on
the residual demand function.20 For the special case  = 0 (and hence also qS = 0) we ﬁnd
19Note that this is still for the special case in which  = 1, qS = qD = 0 and cR = 0. The procedure for the
general case is completely analogous.
20This is the standard textbook solution to the ‘dominant ﬁrm – competitive fringe’ model (see e.g. Carlton
and Perloff, 2000). First of all, note that there is an implicit assumption that Russia is a Stackelberg price
leader vis-` a-vis the competitive fringe. An alternative approach would be to have a Nash-Cournot equilibrium
between Russia and the competitive fringe. Ulph and Folie (1980) compare the two approaches for the case
of oil, and ﬁnd that the Nash-Cournot approach has the undesirable property that it can lead to an unstable
equilibrium in which the dominant ﬁrm’s proﬁts are lower than under perfect competition. In a slightly different
(non-energy) setting, Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) show that in duopolistic price leadership games in which
ﬁrms have capacity constraints, the smaller ﬁrm strictly prefers – under a relatively wide range of conditions –
to be a follower, as opposed to being the leader or making decisions simultaneously. These results support our
assumption that Russia behaves as a Stackelberg leader vis-` a-vis the competitive fringe. Secondly, the standard
textbook approach mentions an alternative solution, in which a dominant ﬁrm with low costs can completely
push the competitive fringe out of the market, by setting a price below the ‘kink’ in the residual demand curve.
However, the calibration later in our paper shows that c0 < cR, so we do not have to consider this alternative
solution.




[( + qD)d0   c0   cR(d0   )] (13)
3.3 Stage 1: Storage investment decision
Equations (10), (12) and (13) describe special cases in which, among others, qS = 0. In the
complete derivation of the model, all these equations are a function of qS, the storage capacity
investment decision that Europe makes in Stage 1. Therefore, also E[S] can be expressed as
a function of a single decision variable qS. In Stage 1, Europe chooses the amount of storage
capacity investment qS that maximizes E[S], obviously subject to the constraint qS  0.22
OnceqS isdetermined, qR;1 canbecomputed, followedbyq0, pR;1, p0, qR;2 andpR;2, according
to the equations above.
The existence of a unique pure-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed because our model con-
sists of a set of sequential decisions, each of which is based on a quadratic (concave) pay-off
function.
4 NUMERICAL RESULTS
The parameters of the model are calibrated on cost data and elasticities from the literature, the
2007 baseline for volume, and the average price 2003-2007. Annex C contains details on the
choice of the parameters, while Annex E performs a sensitivity analysis on the elasticities.
21The resulting contract quantity qR;1 in the general case can be expressed analytically, but the result is long
and not very insightful.
22TheunconstrainedoptimalvalueofqS tendsto 1as ! 0+. Hence, forsufﬁcientlysmall theconstraint
is always binding: qS = 0. Under certain conditions, the constraint is binding across the entire interval  2 [0;1].
Under other conditions, there is a threshold  = S above which the constraint is not binding. In the latter case
the optimal qS can be expressed analytically. However, the threshold S itself cannot be calculated analytically,
since it is the solution of a polynomial of order 7 in . Section 4 numerically computes the threshold levels S
under various conditions.
214.1 Effect of default probability  on long-term gas import contracts and
pay-offs
The top half of Figure 6 shows how quantities and prices vary as , the probability of Russian
‘default’, goes from 0 to 1. The graph also shows the discount p of long-term gas import
contracts offered by Russia compared to contracts offered by the competitive fringe (p =
p0   pR;1).
For  = 0, there is no risk and there is obviously no price difference between the contract
with Russia and the contracts with the competitive fringe. The simulation shows that in this
case, Europe buys qR;1 = 135 bcm per year from Russia and q0 = 94 bcm per year from the
other suppliers. This is not too far from the actual data in 2007 as cited by BP (2006-2008),
which mentions 120 bcm per year from Russia and 95 bcm per year from other non-European
import suppliers. Indeed, until recently, Russia was considered a reliable supplier, and so it is
not surprising that the currently observed market quantities correspond to the case  = 0.
For  > 0 Russia becomes unreliable. When Russia ‘defaults’, it delivers only an an-
nualized amount qR;2 instead of qR;1, at a higher price pR;2 instead of the originally agreed
long-term gas import contract price pR;1. Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows that the quantity with-
held would be around 40% and panel (b) shows that the resulting price increase would be
around 40% as well. Although substantial, such a price increase is only a 2-sigma event
over 3 trading days at gas hubs such as NBP (National Balancing Point, in the UK) when
considering a typical daily volatility of 10%.23
As  increases, Europe increases its volume q0 of long-term gas import contracts with the
competitive fringe, at a slowly increasing contract price p0. Meanwhile, Europe procures a
smaller volume qR;1 with long-term contracts from Russia, even though Russia is obliged to
give an increasing discount p to ‘compensate’ the risk for Europe. It is obvious why Russia
would want to give the discount: as  increases, there is a higher chance that Russia can charge
23In fact over the period 2003-2007 there have been 13 instances of (day-ahead) spot price increases of 40%
or more between the closing prices of two consecutive trading days. However, we need to mention that only a
very small share of gas volumes is traded on the gas hub spot markets, and liquidity is particularly low on the
days with large swings.
22Figure 6: Base scenario: Relation between  (horizontal axis) and quantities, prices,
consumer surplus and supplier proﬁts (vertical axis)






















































Note that qR;2 is an ‘annualized’ amount in the sense of Footnote 16, which means that qR;2 is extrapolated as
if the crisis lasts the entire year instead of 4 months. On the other hand, S2 and R;2 do take into account that
the crisis is limited to 4 months: they contain 4 months of crisis plus 8 months of non-crisis.
23the monopoly price pR;2 in Stage 3 (by supplying only a quantity qR;2 of gas). By giving a
discountp, RussiacaninduceEuropetosignthelong-termgasimportcontractsqR;1 (despite
the unreliability), which puts Europe in a vulnerable situation. For example, for  = 20%, the
Russian contractual discount is 6.3 EUR/tcm or roughly 4.5% of the price, which is consistent
with the approximative equation (11) which predicts a discount of 4.4%. Despite the discount,
Russia loses market share as  increases and for  > 57% supply from the competitive fringe
outstrips Russian supply. Clearly, Europe tries to make itself less dependent on Russia and
therefore less vulnerable in the event of Russian withholding.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 6 show the effect on European surplus and on suppliers’
proﬁts, respectively. Recall that S1 is the European surplus in Case 1 (Russia complies with
long-term contracts) while S2 is the European surplus in Case 2 (Russia defaults). E[S] is the
expected value of the European surplus. For  = 0 and  = 1, we obviously ﬁnd E[S] = S1
and E[S] = S2, respectively. As  increases, E[S] decreases: despite the Russian discount and
shifting supply mix, Russian unreliability causes a loss of expected European surplus. Panel
(d) shows Russia’s proﬁts in Case 1 (R;1), Case 2 (R;2) and the expected value E[R], as
well as the proﬁts 0 obtained by the competitive fringe. Clearly, Russia’s expected proﬁts de-
crease monotonically with increasing : the negative impact of the Russian contract discount
and loss of Russian market share is not sufﬁciently counterbalanced by Russia’s increased
likelihood of beneﬁting from a crisis. The only party gaining from increased unreliability is
the competitive fringe. The competitive fringe proﬁts 0 increase with increasing , because
increased Russian unreliability allows them to sell a larger volume at a higher price.
The most important observation is that both Russia and Europe suffer when  increases.
Although  is exogenous in our model, the results show that it would be attractive for both
Europe and Russia to invest in a more reliable relationship, i.e. lower .
244.2 Conditions for strategic gas storage capacity investment qS > 0
In the simulations of Figure 6, the value of qS is always 0, meaning that it is never interesting
for Europe to build any strategic gas storage capacity whatever the value of . The annual
cost of storage capacity, cS = 50 EUR per tcm per year, is too high compared to the potential
gains. Figure 7 repeats the simulations with cS = 15 EUR per tcm per year.24 The result
Figure 7: Scenario with reduced storage costs: Relation between  (horizontal axis) and
quantities and prices (vertical axis)
























is identical to Figure 6 for  < 30%. For   30%, Russian unreliability is high enough
to make investments in strategic gas storage capacity qS competitive. As of that point, pR;2
(Russia’s potential ‘monopoly price’) drops signiﬁcantly. As a result, Russia’s market share
loss compared to the competitive fringe slows down slightly, while its discount p ﬂattens
out.
24In particular, if the storage site could be set up so that it can be used for seasonal arbitrage while the cushion
gas serves as strategic storage, the cost of strategic storage would be signiﬁcantly reduced. Typical ratios of total
gas (working gas plus cushion gas) to working gas are 3-4 for aquifers and depleted reservoirs, hence our choice
cS = 15 instead of 50 EUR per tcm per year.
25Besides lower storage capacity costs cS, another factor that can encourage investments
in strategic gas storage capacity, is risk aversion. Annex D explains how our model can take
into account European risk aversion, as measured by , the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion.
Typicalvaluesof are2to4forﬁnancialassetsand10to15whenrealassetsarealsoincluded
(Palsson, 1996).  = 0 corresponds to the risk-neutral case which we have been studying in
this paper so far. Figure 8 covers different values of . For each value of , the graph contains
a curve (as a function of ) that shows the maximum value of cS for which qS > 0. There is
Figure 8: Relation between  (horizontal axis) and maximum value of cS (in EUR per
tcm per year) for which qS > 0 (vertical axis), for different levels of risk aversion 

















storage investment qS > 0 in the region of the (;cS) space below each curve. One can see
that for  = 0 and cS = 15 EUR per tcm per year, the storage option becomes interesting for
  30% (point A), which is obviously identical to what has been observed in Figure 7. If
 goes up to 20, then the threshold level comes down to  = 17% (point B). However, for
cS = 50 EUR per tcm per year, storage remains unattractive, unless   50, which is highly
unrealistic.
265 CONCLUSIONS
The ﬁrst research question of this paper is how Russian unreliability may impact the European
gas market and how this affects European gas import decisions. Our numerical simulations
show that it is not optimal for Russia to cut gas supplies to Europe completely during a crisis:
rather, one can expect Russia to reduce its gas supplies by roughly 40%, thereby temporarily
increasing gas prices by roughly 40%. More importantly, the analysis shows that not only
Europe but also Russia suffers when Russia’s probability of default  increases, due to erosion
of its price and market share. The second research question of this paper is to what extent
Europe should invest in strategic gas storage capacity to mitigate the effects of possible supply
withholding by Russia. We ﬁnd that strategic storage capacity is attractive for Europe only if
Russian unreliability is high ( of more than 30%) and storage capacity costs are reduced by a
factor 3 to 4 compared to typical current cost levels. The threshold of 30% default probability
is lowered when Europe is assumed to be risk averse.
The results of this paper are obtained using a partial equilibrium model of the market
for long-term gas import contracts, with differentiated competition between one potentially
unreliable ‘dominant ﬁrm’ (Russia) and a reliable ‘competitive fringe’ of other non-European
import suppliers. Future research could examine the impact of the other suppliers becoming
unreliable as well. Another possible extension is to turn our model into a repeated game.
In such a game,  could become endogenous as part of a mixed Russian strategy. Finally,
the topic of this paper could be placed in a broader comparison of policy measures (import
taxes, rationing, interruptible consumer contracts, etc.) that can be used to address gas import
challenges.
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A Annex: Optimal quantity and price for Russia in case of
default
This annex explains equation (7). Russia’s annualized proﬁts during the crisis are:
R;crisis = (pR;2   cR)qR;2 (14)
29wherepR;2 andqR;2 followtheshort-rundemandcurve(2)aroundthepoint (qD+q0+qR;1;p):
pR;2 = pSR(qD + q0 + qS + qR;2) with pSR(q) = p
 + SR  (q   qR;1   q0   qD) (15)













= [pSR(qD + q0 + qS + qR;2)   cR] + [qR;2  p
0
SR(qD + q0 + qS + qR;2)](16)
Setting (16)= 0 and solving together with (15), yields the monopoly quantity and price shown
in equations (7). Strictly speaking, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for constrained optimization
with constraint qR;2  0 should be used. This constraint is ignored in the analytical presen-
tation of Section 3, but in the numerical simulations of Section 4 it is taken into account, not
only for qR;2, but also for q0, qR;1 and qS. Except for qS, the constraint is never binding. Note
that (7) is the well-known textbook expression for monopoly pricing with linear demand and
constant marginal cost.
B Annex: Russian discount p = p0   pR;1
This annex explains equation (11). We develop a ﬁrst-order approximation for p around
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( + ) + 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 + 3
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[ 3kqR;1      qR;1   q0] (18)
The inverse demand functions (10) describe the special case in which  = 1, qS = qD = 0 and





[ 3kqR;1      qR;1   q0   qD + cR] (19)
which can be further simpliﬁed, using p = +(qD+q0+qR;1) and the short-run equivalent


















































equation (22) can be further approximated by equation (11).27
C Annex: Calibration of the model parameters for the nu-
merical simulations
This section describes the numerical assumptions for the parameters used in our model, which
are based on estimates from the literature.
Demand. The parameters ,  and SR are determined using elasticities from the literature,
the 2007 baseline for volume, and the average price 2003-2007.  can be easily derived from
25Since Section 3.3 shows that qS = 0 for small enough values of , we keep qS = 0 in the derivation of
equation (19).
26Note that Russia’s discount decreases when its rent margin (1   cR=p) increases. Naively, one might think
that Russia’s discount should increase in case of a higher rent margin, since a higher rent margin offers more
ﬁnancial room for discounting. However, a higher rent margin provides Russia with an incentive to withhold
less in the event of a default, thus leading to a lower discount on the long-term contract price.
27With the calibration parameters used in the rest of the paper, the left-hand side of equation (23) is roughly
10 times larger than the right-hand side.







Long-run price elasticity of demand is taken equal to -0.93, following Golombek et al. (1998).
Short-run price elasticity of demand is determined based on the very comprehensive literature
survey of Dahl (1993). In Dahl (1993), the average short-run elasticity over the 15 studies that
compute both short-run and long-run elasticities is -0.27.28 In case this value seems large (in
absolute terms), one should consider that we are ignoring any elasticity of European domestic
supply: qD is exogenous and ﬁxed. A non-zero elasticity of domestic supply would have the
same effect as increasing (in absolute terms) the elasticity of demand. In addition, our model
allows Russia to withhold supplies for 4 months at a time. This means that our short-run
price elasticity of demand relates to a time frame of a few months, which makes the value of
-0.27 seem reasonable. For the sake of safety, Annex E performs a sensitivity analysis on the
elasticities.
According to BP (2006-2008), total European gas consumption in 2007 was qcal = 494
bcm per year. The average German border price as registered by the German government
(BAFA, 2009) was pcal = 144 EUR per tcm over the period 2003-2007. Based on these
numbers and the above-mentioned elasticities, the resulting , SR and, ﬁnally,  can be
determined.
Costs. Total per-unit production and transportation costs are based on OME (2002), which
shows costs curves for additional volumes of gas supply to the EU in 2010.29 For Russia,
marginal costs are assumed constant (cR, see Section 2.2).30 According to OME (2002), the
long-run marginal cost for production in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region with transport through
28Note that the average long-run elasticity of the same 15 studies was -0.99, which is in line with the -0.93
from Golombek et al. (1998).
29Supply to the EU-15 is used because this is the most realistic estimate of the cost of supply to an ‘average’
country in Europe. Using data for EU-27 would understate the costs for Russia.
30Our assumptions about marginal production costs are a slightly simpliﬁed version of Boots et al. (2004) and
Golombek et al. (1995, 1998), who model marginal production costs as:
MCproduction = a + bq + cln(1   q=Q) (25)
32Ukraine (a combination which represents a very large share of current Russian exports) is
$2.8/MMBtu. The long-run marginal cost for production on the Yamal peninsula with trans-
port through Belarus (a combination which represents large future potential for Russian ex-
ports) is also $2.8/MMBtu. We therefore choose cR =$2.8/MMBtu, or 107 EUR/tcm.31 For
the other suppliers, we assume that marginal costs are linearly increasing (c0 + d0q0, see Sec-
tion 2.2). For c0, we choose the cheapest source of gas imports to the EU-15 according to
OME (2002): Algerian gas imported via the MedGaz pipeline at $1.1/MMBtu. So c0 = 42
EUR/tcm. The slope d0 of the marginal cost curve is determined based on the slope of the cost
curve for additional gas imports into the EU-15 on p. 14 of the OME (2002) report, excluding
domestic European and Russian supplies. The cost curve for additional gas supplies starts
at $1.1/MMBtu with Algerian gas, and climbs up to $3.0/MMBtu (Qatar LNG) to reach an
additional volume of 70 bcm per year. We therefore choose d0 = ($1:9=MMBtu)=70 bcm =
1:04 EUR/tcm/bcm. The annual gas storage capacity costs cS are taken at the lower end of the
range 50-70 EUR per tcm per year, mentioned by Mulder and Zwart (2006).
D Annex: Modeling European risk aversion
Equation (3) assumes risk-neutrality: Europe maximizes the expected value of European sur-
plus S. The most straightforward way to introduce risk aversion is to assume instead that
Europe maximizes the expected value of a concave transformation of European surplus. A
theoretical justiﬁcation for this transformation is to model European decision-making using
the Stigler-Peltzman model32 and assume that Europe maximizes a political support function
where q is production and Q is capacity (the third term makes production costs go up to inﬁnity as soon as
capacity is reached). The constants a, b, c and Q are determined for each supplier country separately. The exact
values of a, b, c and Q are listed in Golombek et al. (1995), and are the same in the three studies Boots et al.
(2004) and Golombek et al. (1995, 1998). For Russia however, b is 0, which is in line with the assumption of
constant marginal cost used in this paper. Compared to Boots et al. (2004) and Golombek et al. (1995, 1998),
our main assumptions are that (i) we leave out the non-linear capacity term cln(1   q=Q) for both Russia and
the other suppliers (to keep our model analytically solvable), and (ii) we aggregate the production of the other
suppliers and assume a linear marginal cost curve for the total.
31USD/EUR conversions are done at the average exchange rate for the year 2002 in which the OME estimates
were made (1 USD = 1.06 EUR).
32See Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976).
33M:
M = M(CS;D; G) (26)
instead of maximizing just S as in equation (3). Assuming that different constituencies are
treated identically, we can simplify the expression for M:
M = f(S) with S = CS + D   G (27)
Following Peltzman (1976), we have f0 > 0 and f00 < 0. If Europe’s objective is to maximize
the expected value of M, then the concavity of f leads to risk averse behavior.33 To make
the degree of risk aversion explicit, we choose a particular functional form for f(), namely a
function that yields constant relative risk aversion (CRRA):




 is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion.34
To determine the European inverse demand functions for long-term gas import contracts
(Section 3.2), we need to maximize E[M] = E[f(S)] instead of E[S]. Since f0 > 0, the
maximization of E[f(S)] is equivalent to the maximization of C = f 1(E[f(S)]). Let us
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+ higher-order terms in  and  (29)
in which the last step results from a Taylor expansion around  = 0 and  = 0. By deﬁning :
 =  +
1
2




33In the true sense of the political support function, this would only model the risk aversion of the politicians.
However, we shall assume that risk aversion of consumers and domestic producers is also included in f.
34The precise level of risk aversion  is a parameter to the simulations. Section 4.2 contains simulations for
different values of .
34we can rewrite equation (29) as:
C  S1    = S1   S = (1   )S1 + S2 (31)
Equation (31) is completely equivalent to equation (9) but with  replaced by . The analytical
results of Section 3 therefore remain valid for a risk averse Europe, provided we replace  by 
in equations modeling Europe’s decisions. This approach has the advantage of having a very
intuitive interpretation: in equation (31), Europe ‘perceives’ a Russian default probability ,
which is different from the ‘real’ default probability . Europe’s risk aversion is thus modeled
as a higher perceived default probability.35 For the cases  = 0 and  = 1, there is no
uncertainty, so  = . The more uncertainty (i.e. the closer to  = 0:5), the larger the
difference between  and .
E Annex: Sensitivity analysis on elasticities
The analyses in Section 4 assume that long-run price elasticity of European demand for im-
portedgasis-0.93, andthattheshort-runelasticityis-0.27. Inotherwords, theratiok between
long-run and short-run elasticities is 3.4 (k = e=eSR = SR=). The empirical evidence on
this ratio k, however, is scattered. Neuhoff and Hirschhausen (2005) report k values of 4 to 5
for industrial demand, and 5 up to 10 for residential and commercial demand. In this section
we shall brieﬂy review how the results of Section 4.1 change when we double k from 3.4 to
6.8.
First, let us double k by reducing the short-run elasticity to half its original value, i.e. we
set eSR =  0:14 instead of  0:27. The slope of the short-run demand curve SR becomes
twice as steep. We keep the long-run elasticity e of gas demand constant, meaning that 
35The caveat is that  is actually not a constant, but depends on A, which is the proportional ‘deviation’
between S1 and S2. However, in addition to the approximations already made in the derivation of equation (31),
 is treated as a constant in subsequent analyses.  therefore changes with  as deﬁned in equation (30), but
does not depend on S1 and S2, because a ﬁxed A is taken. The value of A is chosen to be 0.05 in the numerical
simulations. This is about twice the value observed in Figure 6 (Panel (c)) in order to take into account the fact
that the absolute value of European surplus is probably lower due to the costs of domestic production, which are
ignored in the computation of E[S].
35Figure 9: Scenario with halved short-run elasticity: Relation between  (horizontal axis)
and quantities and prices (vertical axis)


























Figure 10: Scenario with double long-run elasticity: Relation between  (horizontal axis)
and quantities and prices (vertical axis)


























36is held constant. The simulation results are shown in Figure 9 and are graphically similar
to those in Figure 6, but the effects are more pronounced: Russia’s monopolistic price pR;2
is obviously higher, its market share declines faster as a function of , while its discount
increases more steeply, as is expected based on equation (11). However, still no storage is
built when cS = 50 EUR per tcm per year.
Secondly, let us double k by increasing the long-run elasticity to twice its original value,
while keeping eSR =  0:27.36 The results are shown in Figure 10. Because of the very
high long-run elasticity, the volume of long-term gas import contracts with Russia for  = 0
exceeds quite signiﬁcantly the actual 2007 volume: 197 bcm per year versus the actual 120
bcm per year. However, the large value of k brings the volumes down quite rapidly as 
increases. As of   0:5 the results become graphically very similar to the base scenario in
Figure 6.
All in all, the conclusions are fairly robust vis-` a-vis changes in k.
36While this seems quite an extreme stress-test, one can argue that it is justiﬁed because long-run elasticity of
domestic supply qD is ignored in this paper. Furthermore, note that a change in  requires also a change in  to
make sure that the new demand curve still passes through the same calibration point.
37